Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience

On January 1, 1999, 11 member countries of the European Union (EU) adopted a common currency, the euro. Two years later they were joined by Greece. Europe's bold experiment in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which many had viewed as a visionary fantasy only a few years earlier, created a currency area with more than 300 million consumers—roughly 10 percent more populous than the United States. If the countries of eastern Europe all eventually enter the euro zone, it will comprise more than 25 countries and stretch from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Mediterranean Sea in the south, and from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Black Sea in the east. Figure 20-1 shows the extent of the euro zone as of 2005.

The birth of the euro resulted in fixed exchange rates between all EMU member countries. In deciding to form a monetary union, however, EMU countries sacrificed even more sovereignty over their monetary policies than a fixed exchange rate regime normally requires. They agreed to give up national currencies entirely and to hand over control of their monetary policies to a shared European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

The European experience raises a host of important questions. How and why did Europe set up its single currency? Will the euro be good for the economies of its members? How will the euro affect countries outside of EMU, notably the United States? And what lessons does the European experience carry for other potential currency blocs, such as the Mercosur trading group in South America?

This chapter focuses on Europe's experience of monetary unification to illustrate the economic benefits and costs of fixed exchange rate agreements and more comprehensive currency unification schemes. As we see in Europe's experience, the effects of joining a fixed exchange rate agreement are complex and depend crucially on microeconomic and macroeconomic factors. Our discussion of Europe will throw light not only on the forces promoting greater unification of national economies but also on the forces that make a country think twice before giving up completely its control over domestic monetary policy.

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Learning Goals

After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

- Discuss why Europeans have long sought to stabilize their mutual exchange rates while floating against the U.S. dollar.
- Describe how the European Union, through the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, placed itself on the road to having a single currency, the euro, issued and managed by a European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
- Detail the structure of the ESCB and the European Union's restrictions on member states' fiscal policies.
- Articulate the main lessons of the theory of optimum currency areas.
- Recount how the 12 countries using the euro have fared so far in their currency union.

How the European Single Currency Evolved

The Bretton Woods system (which fell apart in 1973) fixed every member country’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and as a result also fixed the exchange rate between every pair of nondollar currencies. While allowing their currencies to float against the dollar after 1973, EU countries have tried progressively to narrow the extent to which they let their currencies fluctuate against each other. These efforts culminated in the birth of the euro on January 1, 1999.
TABLE 20-1  A Brief Glossary of Eurlonyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCB</td>
<td>European System of Central Banks</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Stability and Growth Pact</td>
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What Has Driven European Monetary Cooperation?

What prompted the EU countries to seek closer coordination of monetary policies and greater mutual exchange rate stability? Two main motives inspired these moves and have remained major reasons for the adoption of the euro:

1. To enhance Europe’s role in the world monetary system. The events leading up to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system were accompanied by declining European confidence in the readiness of the United States to place its international monetary responsibilities ahead of its national interests (Chapter 18). By speaking with a single voice on monetary issues, EU countries hoped to defend more effectively their own economic interests in the face of an increasingly self-absorbed United States.

2. To turn the European Union into a truly unified market. Even though the 1957 Treaty of Rome founding the EU had established a customs union, significant official barriers to the movements of goods and factors within Europe remained. A consistent goal of EU members has been to eliminate all such barriers and transform the EU into a huge unified market on the model of the United States. European officials believed, however, that exchange rate uncertainty, like official trade barriers, was a major factor reducing trade within Europe. They also feared that if exchange rate swings caused large changes in intra-European relative prices, political forces hostile to free trade within Europe would be strengthened. 1

The key to understanding how Europe has come so far in both market and monetary unification lies in the continent’s war-torn history. After the end of World War II in 1945, many European leaders agreed that economic cooperation and integration among the former belligerents would be the best guarantee against a repetition of the twentieth century’s two devastating wars. The result was a gradual ceding of national economic policy powers to centralized European Union governing bodies, such as the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium (the EU’s executive body), and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany.

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1 A very important administrative reason Europeans have sought to avoid big movements in European cross-exchange rates is related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU’s system of agricultural price supports. Prior to the euro, agricultural prices were quoted in terms of the European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket of EU currencies. Exchange rate realignments within Europe would abruptly alter the real domestic value of the supported prices, provoking protests from farmers in the revaluing countries. The book by Giavazzi and Giovannini in Further Reading describes the concerted policies the EU used to minimize such internal redistributions after realignments. While the annoyance of administering the CAP under exchange rate realignments was undoubtedly crucial in starting Europeans on the road to currency unification, the two motives cited in the text are more important in explaining how Europe ultimately came to embrace a common currency.
The European Monetary System, 1979–1998

The first significant institutional step on the road to European monetary unification was the European Monetary System (EMS). The eight original participants in the EMS’s exchange rate mechanism—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—began operating a formal network of mutually pegged exchange rates in March 1979. A complex set of EMS intervention arrangements worked to restrict the exchange rates of participating currencies within specified fluctuation margins.2

The prospects for a successful fixed-rate area in Europe seemed bleak in early 1979, when recent yearly inflation rates ranged from Germany’s 2.7 percent to Italy’s 12.1 percent. Through a mixture of policy cooperation and realignment, however, the EMS fixed exchange rate club survived and even grew, adding Spain to its ranks in 1989, Britain in 1990, and Portugal early in 1992. Only in September 1992 did this growth suffer a sudden setback when Britain and Italy left the EMS exchange rate mechanism at the start of a protracted European currency crisis that forced the remaining members in August 1993 to retreat to very wide exchange rate margins.

The EMS’s operation was aided by several safety valves that initially helped reduce the frequency of such crises. Most exchange rates “fixed” by the EMS until August 1993 actually could fluctuate up or down by as much as 2.25 percent relative to an assigned par value, although several members were able to negotiate bands of ±6 percent, thus maintaining somewhat greater latitude to choose monetary policies. In August 1993 most EMS bands were widened to ±15 percent under the pressure of speculative attacks.

As another crucial safety valve, the EMS developed generous provisions for the extension of credit from strong- to weak-currency members. If the French franc depreciated too far against the DM, for example, Germany’s central bank, the Bundesbank, was expected to lend the Bank of France DM that could be sold for francs in the foreign exchange market.

Finally, during the system’s initial years of operation several members (notably France and Italy) reduced the possibility of speculative attack by maintaining capital controls that directly limited domestic residents’ sales of home for foreign currencies.

The EMS went through periodic currency realignments. In all, 11 realignments occurred between the start of the EMS in March 1979 and January 1987. Capital controls played the important role of shielding members’ reserves from speculators during these adjustments. Starting in 1987, however, a phased removal of capital controls by EMS countries increased the possibility of speculative attacks and thus reduced governments’ willingness openly to consider devaluing or revaluing. The removal of controls greatly reduced member countries’ monetary independence, but freedom of payments and capital movements within the EU had always been a key element of EU countries’ plan to turn Europe into a unified single market.

For a period of five and a half years after January 1987, no adverse economic event was able to shake the EMS’s commitment to its fixed exchange rates. This state of affairs came to an end in 1992, however, as economic shocks caused by the reunification of eastern and western Germany in 1990 led to asymmetrical macroeconomic pressures in Germany and in its major EMS partners.

The result of reunification was a boom in Germany and higher inflation, which Germany’s very inflation-averse central bank, the Bundesbank, resisted through sharply higher interest rates. Other EMS countries such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, however, were not simultaneously booming. By matching the high German interest rates to hold

2 As a technical matter, all EU members were members of the EMS, but only those EMS members who enforced the fluctuation margins belonged to the EMS exchange rate mechanism (ERM).
their currencies fixed against Germany’s, they were unwillingly pushing their own economies into deep recession. The policy conflict between Germany and its partners led to a series of fierce speculative attacks on the EMS exchange parities starting in September 1992. By August 1993, as previously noted, the EMS was forced to retreat to very wide (±15 percent) bands, which it kept in force until the introduction of the euro in 1999.

**German Monetary Dominance and the Credibility Theory of the EMS**

Earlier we identified two main reasons why the European Union sought to fix internal exchange rates: a desire to defend Europe’s economic interests more effectively on the world stage and the ambition to achieve greater internal economic unity.

Europe’s experience of high inflation in the 1970s suggests an additional purpose that the EMS came to fulfill. By fixing their exchange rates against the DM, the other EMS countries in effect imported the German Bundesbank’s credibility as an inflation fighter and thus discouraged the development of inflationary pressures at home—pressures they might otherwise have been tempted to accommodate through monetary expansion. This view, the credibility theory of the EMS, is a variant of the “discipline” argument against floating exchange rates (Chapter 19): The political costs of violating an international exchange rate agreement can restrain governments from deprecating their currencies to gain the short-term advantage of an economic boom at the long-term cost of higher inflation.

Policymakers in inflation-prone EMS countries, such as Italy, clearly gained credibility by placing monetary policy decisions in the hands of the inflation-fearing German central bank. Devaluation was still possible, but only subject to EMS restrictions. Because politicians also feared they would look incompetent to voters if they devalued, a government’s decision to peg to the DM reduced both its willingness and ability to create domestic inflation.³

Added support for the credibility theory comes from the behavior of inflation rates relative to Germany’s, shown in Figure 20-2 for six of the other original EMS members.⁴ As the figure shows, annual inflation rates gradually converged toward the low German levels.⁵

**The EU “1992” Initiative**

The EU countries have tried to achieve greater internal economic unity not only by fixing mutual exchange rates, but also through direct measures to encourage the free flow of goods, services, and factors of production. Later in this chapter you will learn that the extent of product and factor market integration within Europe helps to determine how fixed exchange rates affect Europe’s macroeconomic stability. Europe’s efforts to raise microeconomic efficiency through direct market liberalization have also increased its preference for mutually fixed exchange rates on macroeconomic grounds. The most recent phase of EU

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⁴ Figure 20-2 does not include the tiny country of Luxembourg because before 1999 that country had a currency union with Belgium and an inflation rate very close to Belgium’s.

⁵ Those skeptical of the credibility theory of EMS inflation convergence point out that the United States, Britain, and Japan also reduced inflation to low levels over the 1980s, but did so without fixing their exchange rates. After the euro was introduced in 1999 there was some widening of inflation differences, as we discuss below.
market liberalization, an ambitious plan known as the “1992” initiative because all of its goals were supposed to have been met by January 1, 1993, therefore is an important consideration in our discussion of European exchange rate policy. (Recall Chapter 9.)

The process of market unification that began when the original EU members formed their customs union in 1957 was still incomplete 30 years later. In a number of industries, such as automobiles and telecommunications, trade within Europe was discouraged by government-imposed standards and registration requirements; often government licensing or purchasing practices gave domestic producers virtual monopoly positions in their home markets. Differing national tax structures also inhibited trade. For example, countries with high value-added taxes had to post customs officials at EU frontiers to prevent their citizens from shopping in neighboring low-tax countries. Significant barriers to factor movements within Europe also remained.6

In the Single European Act of 1986 (which amended the founding Treaty of Rome), EU members took the crucial political steps to remove remaining internal barriers to trade, capital movements, and labor migration. Most important, they dropped the Treaty of Rome’s

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requirement of unanimous consent for measures related to market completion, so that one or
two self-interested EU members could not block trade liberalization measures as in the past.

By now most of 1992's market integration measures have been implemented. National
economic barriers within Europe generally are lower than in the mid-1980s, but 1992 has
been more effective in some areas than in others. Financial capital, for example, can move
quite freely, not only within the European Union, but between the European Union and out-
side jurisdictions.

**European Economic and Monetary Union**

Countries can link their currencies together in many ways. We can imagine that the differ-
ent modes of linkage form a spectrum, with the arrangements at one end requiring little sac-
ifice of monetary policy independence while those at the other end require independence to
be given up entirely.

The early EMS, characterized by frequent currency realignments and widespread gov-
ernment control over capital movements, left some scope for national monetary policies. In
1989 a committee headed by Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, rec-
ommended a three-stage transition to a goal at the other extreme end of the policy spectrum
just described. That goal was an **economic and monetary union (EMU)**, a European
Union in which national currencies would be replaced by a single EU currency managed by
a sole central bank operating on behalf of all EU members.

On December 10, 1991, the leaders of the EU countries met at the ancient Dutch city
of Maastricht and agreed to propose for national ratification far-reaching amendments to
the Treaty of Rome. These amendments were meant to place the EU squarely on the road to
EMU. Included in the 250-page **Maastricht Treaty** was a provision calling for the
introduction of the single European currency and European central bank no later than Jan-
uary 1, 1999. By 1993, all 12 countries then belonging to the EU had ratified the Maa-
stricht Treaty. Austria, Finland, and Sweden accepted the Treaty's provisions upon joining
the EU in 1995.\(^7\)

Why did the EU countries move away from the EMS and toward the much more ambi-
tious goal of a single shared currency? There were four reasons:

1. They believed a single EU currency would produce a greater degree of European
market integration than fixed exchange rates by removing the threat of EMS currency
realignments and eliminating the costs to traders of converting one EMS currency into
another. The single currency was viewed as a necessary complement to the 1992 plan
for unifying EU markets into a single continent-wide market.

2. Some EU leaders thought Germany's management of EMS monetary policy had
placed a one-sided emphasis on German macroeconomic goals at the expense of its
EMS partners' interests. The European Central Bank that would replace the German
Bundesbank under EMU would have to be more considerate of other countries' prob-
lems, and it would automatically give those countries the same opportunity as Germany
to participate in system-wide monetary policy decisions.

3. Given the move to complete freedom of capital movements within the EU, there
seemed to be little to gain, and much to lose, from keeping national currencies with
fixed (but adjustable) parities rather than irrevocably locking parities through a single
currency. Any system of fixed exchange rates among distinct national currencies would

\(^7\) Denmark and the United Kingdom, however, ratified the Maastricht Treaty subject to special exceptions allowing
them to "opt out" of the Treaty's monetary provisions and retain their national currencies.
be subject to ferocious speculative attacks, as in 1992–1993. If Europeans wished to combine permanently fixed exchange rates with freedom of capital movements, a single currency was the best solution.

4. As previously noted, all of the EU countries’ leaders hoped the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions would guarantee the political stability of Europe. Beyond its purely economic functions, the single EU currency was intended as a potent symbol of Europe’s desire to place cooperation ahead of the national rivalries that often had led to war in the past. Under this scenario, the new currency would align the economic interests of individual European nations to create an overwhelming political constituency for peace on the continent.

The Maastricht Treaty’s critics denied that EMU would have these positive effects and opposed the treaty’s provisions for vesting stronger governmental powers with the European Union. To these critics, EMU was symptomatic of a tendency for the European Union’s central institutions to ignore local needs, meddle in local affairs, and downgrade prized symbols of national identity (including, of course, national currencies).

The Euro and Economic Policy in the Euro Zone
How were the initial members of EMU chosen, how are new members admitted, and what is the structure of the complex of financial and political institutions that govern economic policy in the euro zone? This section provides an overview.

The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact
The Maastricht Treaty specifies that EU member countries must satisfy several macroeconomic convergence criteria before they can be admitted to EMU. Among these criteria are:

1. The country’s inflation rate in the year before admission must be no more than 1.5 percent above the average rate of the three EU member states with lowest inflation.
2. The country must have maintained a stable exchange rate within the ERM without devaluing on its own initiative.
3. The country must have a public-sector deficit no higher than 3 percent of its GDP (except in exceptional and temporary circumstances).
4. The country must have a public debt that is below or approaching a reference level of 60 percent of its GDP.

The Treaty provides for the ongoing monitoring of criteria 3 and 4 above by the European Commission even after admission to EMU, and for the levying of penalties on countries that violate these fiscal rules and do not correct situations of “excessive” deficits and debt. The surveillance and sanctions over high deficits and debts place national governments under constraints in the exercise of their national fiscal powers. For example, a highly indebted EMU country facing a national recession might be unable to use expansionary fiscal policy for fear of breaching the Maastricht limits—a possibly costly loss of policy autonomy, given the absence of a national monetary policy.

In addition, a supplementary Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) negotiated by European leaders in 1997 tightens the fiscal straitjacket further. The SGP sets out “the medium-term budgetary objective of positions close to balance or in surplus.” It also sets out a timetable for
the imposition of financial penalties on countries that fail to correct situations of "excessive" deficits and debt promptly enough. However, the SGP has not been enforced in practice.

What explains the macroeconomic convergence criteria, the fear of high public debts, and the SGP? Before they would sign the Maastricht Treaty, low-inflation countries such as Germany wanted assurance that their EMU partners had learned to prefer an environment of low inflation and fiscal restraint. They feared that otherwise, the euro might be a weak currency, falling prey to the types of policies that have fueled French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and United Kingdom inflation at various points since the early 1970s. The architects of the Maastricht Treaty also feared that high public deficits and debts would lead to pressures on the new European Central Bank to purchase government debt directly, thereby fueling money supply growth and inflation.\(^8\)

As EMU came closer in 1997, German public opinion remained opposed to the euro out of fear that the new currency would not be as strong as the DM had been. The German government demanded the SGP as a way of convincing domestic voters that the new eurosystem would indeed produce low inflation. Ironically, Germany (along with France) is one of the countries that has recently been in violation of the Maastricht fiscal rules! At French and German urging, the EU watered down the SGP in March 2005.

By May 1998, it was clear that 11 EU countries had satisfied the convergence criteria on the basis of 1997 data and would be founder members of EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Britain and Denmark exercised their privileges to stand apart from monetary union. Sweden failed to satisfy the exchange rate criterion (criterion 2 above), having not previously been a member of the ERM. Greece failed to qualify on any of the criteria in 1998, although it ultimately passed all of its tests and entered EMU on January 1, 2001.

**The European System of Central Banks**

The European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which conducts monetary policy for the euro zone, consists of the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt plus the 12 national central banks, which now play a role analogous to the regional Federal Reserve banks in the United States. Decisions of the ESCB are made by votes of the governing council of the ECB, consisting of a six-member ECB executive board (including the president of the ECB) and the heads of the national central banks.

The authors of the Maastricht Treaty hoped to create an independent central bank free of the political influences that might lead to inflation.\(^9\) The Treaty gives the ESCB an overriding mandate to pursue price stability and includes many provisions intended to insulate monetary policy decisions from political influence. In addition, unlike any other central bank in the world, the ESCB operates above and beyond the reach of any single national government. In the United States, for example, the Congress could easily pass laws reducing the

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Designing and Naming a New Currency

Among the least of the obstacles to achieving the comprehensive monetary union envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty were the choices of a look and a name for the new single European currency. Nonetheless, agreement was hard to reach.

Some European leaders wanted to retain a national symbol on the euro bills their national central banks issued, although the national bills would circulate throughout Europe in the same way that U.S. dollar bills bearing the imprint of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, for example, may turn up in New Yorkers’ wallets. The British, in particular, insisted that their monarch appear on their banknotes, regardless of what the rest of Europe did. In the end, a compromise was reached. Euro notes do not carry national symbols. Euro coins, however, do have a “European,” side and a “national” side upon which national symbols of the issuing country may appear.

A generic euro note superimposes the EU flag (a circle of 12 yellow stars on a field of dark blue) upon an imaginary European architectural masterpiece. The European Union gave a full description of the notes and the rationale for their design (see the EU website, http://europa.eu.int/euro/html):

There are 7 euro notes. In different colours and sizes they are denominated in 500, 200, 100, 50, 20, 10 and 5 euros. The designs are symbolic for Europe’s architectural heritage. They do not represent any existing monuments. Windows and gateways dominate the front side of each banknote as symbols of the spirit of openness and cooperation in the EU. The reverse side of each banknote features a bridge from a particular age, a metaphor for communication among the people of Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world. Final designs were announced in December 1996 at the Dublin European Council. All notes will carry advanced security features.

There were even more exotic proposals in the air, however, before the current design was chosen.

Among the ideas floated: notes carrying Michelangelo’s David or the Phoenician princess Europa who, in Greek mythology, was carried off to Crete by the god Zeus (who took the form of a bull for the occasion). Indeed, this episode is shown on the back of the Greek two-euro coin.

The new currency’s name was another problem until euro was chosen in December 1995. The Maastricht Treaty refers to the single currency as the ECU, or European Currency Unit, but most European leaders thought it would be misleading and politically awkward to adopt the name of a preexisting currency basket—and one that has depreciated sharply against the DM at that. A further problem was German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s reported objection that in German “ein ECU” sounds like “eine Kuh,” German for “a cow.” Other proposed names included the franken and the shilling.

For some, christening the new currency “euro” was a reluctant compromise. Britain’s prime minister complained that the name euro didn’t send the blood coursing through his veins (unlike pound, presumably). The Greeks noted that euro sounds like their word for urine. Nonetheless, euro it is.

Yet another problem arose after the admission of 10 new member states to the EU in May 2004. Prior to the euro’s launch, EU leaders had agreed that their new currency’s name would have the same spelling in every EU country (except in Greece, which does not use the Latin alphabet and spells the currency’s name evro). In five of the countries that entered the EU in 2004, however, terms other than euro were already in use. For example, Lithuanians refer to one euro as a euros, whereas the word euro has a distinct meaning in their language. As a result, EU diplomats decided late in 2004 that the o was dispensable, but that all EU names for the euro had to begin with eur.

Even that compromise left Latvia in a quandary, because its term for the European currency has a second letter different from u. Perhaps wisely in view of the many more pressing problems raised by the EU’s expansion, its leaders left this one for the Latvians to solve.†

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independence of the Federal Reserve. The ESCB is required to brief the European Parliament regularly on its activities, but the European Parliament has no power to alter the ESCB’s statute. That would require an amendment to the Maastricht Treaty, approved by legislatures or voters in every member country of the EU. Critics of the Treaty argue that it goes too far in shielding the ESCB from normal democratic processes. The special position of the ESCB risks alienating the public, these critics charge, by removing any mechanism that might make the ESCB accountable to electorates for its actions.

**The Revised Exchange Rate Mechanism**

For EU countries that are not yet members of EMU, a revised exchange rate mechanism—referred to as ERM 2—defines broad exchange rate zones against the euro (±15 percent) and specifies reciprocal intervention arrangements to support these target zones. ERM 2 was viewed as necessary to discourage competitive devaluations against the euro by EU members outside the euro zone and to give would-be EMU entrants a way of satisfying the Maastricht Treaty’s exchange rate stability convergence criterion. Under ERM 2 rules, either the ECB or the national central bank of an EU member with its own currency can suspend euro intervention operations if they result in money supply changes that threaten to destabilize the domestic price level. ERM 2 is therefore asymmetric, with peripheral countries pegging to the euro and adjusting passively to ECB decisions on interest rates.

In May 2004, the EU had its greatest expansion ever, admitting 10 new members: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania quickly entered ERM 2, and the other new entrants will have to join as well before they can adopt the euro.

**The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas**

There is little doubt that the European monetary integration process has helped advance the political goals of its founders by giving the European Union a stronger position in international affairs. The survival and future development of the European monetary experiment depend more heavily, however, on its ability to help countries reach their economic goals. Here the picture is less clear because a country’s decision to fix its exchange rate can in principle lead to economic sacrifices as well as to benefits.

We saw in Chapter 19 that by changing its exchange rate, a country may succeed in cushioning the disruptive impact of various economic shocks. On the other hand, exchange rate flexibility can have potentially harmful effects, such as making relative prices less predictable or undermining the government’s resolve to keep inflation in check. To weigh the economic costs of joining a group of countries with mutually fixed exchange rates against the advantages, we need a framework for thinking systematically about the stabilization powers a country sacrifices and the gains in efficiency and credibility it may reap.

In this section we show that a country’s costs and benefits from joining a fixed exchange rate area such as the EMS depend on how integrated its economy is with those of its potential partners. The analysis leading to this conclusion, which is known as the theory of optimum currency areas, predicts that fixed exchange rates are most appropriate for areas closely integrated through international trade and factor movements.

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Economic Integration and the Benefits of a Fixed Exchange Rate Area: The GG Schedule

Consider how an individual country, for example, Norway, might approach the decision of whether to join an area of fixed exchange rates, for example, the euro zone. Our goal is to develop a simple diagram that clarifies Norway’s choice.

We begin by deriving the first of two elements in the diagram, a schedule called GG that shows how the potential gain to Norway from joining the euro zone depends on Norway’s trading links with that region. Let us assume Norway is considering pegging its currency, the krone, to the euro.

A major economic benefit of fixed exchange rates is that they simplify economic calculations and provide a more predictable basis for decisions that involve international transactions than do floating rates. Imagine the time and resources American consumers and businesses would waste every day if each of the 50 United States had its own currency that fluctuated in value against the currencies of all the other states! Norway faces a similar disadvantage in its trade with the euro zone when it allows its krone to float against the euro. The monetary efficiency gain from joining the fixed exchange rate system equals the joiner’s saving from avoiding the uncertainty, confusion, and calculation and transaction costs that arise when exchange rates float.\(^\text{11}\)

In practice, it may be hard to attach a precise number to the total monetary efficiency gain Norway would enjoy as a result of pegging to the euro. We can be sure, however, that this gain will be higher if Norway trades a lot with euro zone countries. For example, if Norway’s trade with the euro zone amounts to 50 percent of its GNP while its trade with the United States amounts to only 5 percent of GNP, then, other things equal, a fixed krone/euro exchange rate clearly yields a greater monetary efficiency gain to Norwegian traders than a fixed krone/dollar rate. Similarly, the efficiency gain from a fixed krone/euro rate is greater when trade between Norway and the euro zone is extensive than when it is small.

The monetary efficiency gain from pegging the krone to the euro will also be higher if factors of production can migrate freely between Norway and the euro area. Norwegians who invest in euro zone countries benefit when the returns on their investments are more predictable. Similarly, Norwegians who work in euro zone countries may benefit if a fixed exchange rate makes their wages more stable relative to Norway’s cost of living.

Our conclusion is that a high degree of economic integration between a country and a fixed exchange rate area magnifies the monetary efficiency gain the country reaps when it fixes its exchange rate against the area’s currencies. The more extensive are cross-border trade and factor movements, the greater is the gain from a fixed cross-border exchange rate.

The upward-sloping curve GG in Figure 20-3 shows the relation between a country’s degree of economic integration with a fixed exchange rate area and the monetary efficiency gain to the country from joining the area. The figure’s horizontal axis measures the extent to which Norway (the joining country in our example) is economically integrated into euro zone product and factor markets. The vertical axis measures the monetary efficiency gain to Norway from pegging to the euro. GG’s positive slope reflects the conclusion that the monetary efficiency gain a country gets by joining a fixed exchange rate area rises as its economic integration with the area increases.

In our example we have implicitly assumed that the larger exchange rate area, the euro zone, has a stable and predictable price level. If it does not, the greater variability in

\(^{11}\)To illustrate just one component of the monetary efficiency gain, potential savings of commissions paid to brokers and banks on foreign exchange transactions, Charles R. Bean of the London School of Economics estimated that in 1992 a “round-trip” through all the European Union currencies would result in the loss of fully half the original sum. See the paper by Bean in this chapter’s Further Reading.
Norway’s price level that would follow a decision to join the exchange rate area would likely offset any monetary efficiency gain a fixed exchange rate might provide. A different problem arises if Norway’s commitment to fix the krone’s exchange rate is not fully believed by economic actors. In this situation, some exchange rate uncertainty would remain and Norway would therefore enjoy a smaller monetary efficiency gain. If the euro zone’s price level is stable and Norway’s exchange rate commitment is firm, however, the main conclusion follows: When Norway pegs to the euro, it gains from the stability of its currency against the euro, and this efficiency gain is greater the more closely tied are Norway’s markets with euro zone markets.

Earlier in this chapter we learned that a country may wish to peg its exchange rate to an area of price stability to import the anti-inflationary resolve of the area’s monetary authorities. When the economy of the pegging country is well integrated with that of the low-inflation area, however, low domestic inflation is easier to achieve. The reason is that close economic integration leads to international price convergence and therefore lessens the scope for independent variation in the pegging country’s price level. This argument provides another reason why high economic integration with a fixed exchange rate area enhances a country’s gain from membership.

**Economic Integration and the Costs of a Fixed Exchange Rate Area: The LL Schedule**

Membership in an exchange rate area may involve costs as well as benefits, even when the area has low inflation. These costs arise because a country that joins an exchange rate area gives up its ability to use the exchange rate and monetary policy for the purpose of stabilizing output and employment. This economic stability loss from joining, like the country’s monetary efficiency gain, is related to the country’s economic integration with its exchange rate partners. We can derive a second schedule, the LL schedule, that shows the relationship graphically.

In Chapter 19’s discussion of the relative merits of fixed and floating exchange rates, we concluded that when the economy is disturbed by a change in the output market (that is, by a shift in the DD schedule), a floating exchange rate has an advantage over a fixed rate: It automatically cushions the economy’s output and employment by allowing an immediate
change in the relative price of domestic and foreign goods. Furthermore, you will recall from Chapter 17 that when the exchange rate is fixed, purposeful stabilization is more difficult because monetary policy has no power at all to affect domestic output. Given these two conclusions, we would expect changes in the DD schedule to have more severe effects on an economy in which the monetary authority is required to fix the exchange rate against a group of foreign currencies. The extra instability caused by the fixed exchange rate is the economic stability loss.\footnote{You might think that when Norway unilaterally fixes its exchange rate against the euro, but leaves the krone free to float against non-euro currencies, it is able to keep at least some monetary independence. Perhaps surprisingly, this intuition is wrong. The reason is that any independent money supply change in Norway would put pressure on krone interest rates and thus on the krone/euro exchange rate. So by pegging the krone even to a single foreign currency, Norway completely surrenders its domestic monetary control. This result has, however, a positive side for Norway. After Norway unilaterally pegs the krone to the euro, domestic money market disturbances (shifts in the AA schedule) will no longer affect domestic output, despite the continuing float against non-euro currencies. Why? Because Norway’s interest rate must equal the euro interest rate, any pure shifts in AA will (as in Chapter 19) result in immediate reserve inflows or outflows that leave Norway’s interest rate unchanged. Thus, a krone/euro peg alone is enough to provide automatic stability in the face of any monetary shocks that shift the AA schedule. This is why the discussion in the text can focus on shifts in the DD schedule.}

To derive the LL schedule we must understand how the extent of Norway’s economic integration with the euro zone will affect the size of this loss in economic stability. Imagine that Norway is pegging to the euro and there is a fall in the aggregate demand for Norway’s output—a leftward shift of Norway’s DD schedule. If the DD schedules of the other euro zone countries happen simultaneously to shift to the left, the euro will simply depreciate against outside currencies, providing the automatic stabilization we studied in the last chapter. Norway has a serious problem only when it alone faces a fall in demand—for example, if the world demand for oil, one of Norway’s main exports, drops.

How will Norway adjust to this shock? Since nothing has happened to budge the euro, to which Norway is pegged, its krone will remain stable against all foreign currencies. Full employment will be restored only after a period of costly slump during which the prices of Norwegian goods and the wages of Norwegian workers fall.

How does the severity of this slump depend on the level of economic integration between the Norwegian economy and those of the EMU countries? The answer is that greater integration implies a shallower slump, and therefore a less costly adjustment to the adverse shift in DD. There are two reasons for this reduction in the cost of adjustment. First, if Norway has close trading links with the euro zone, a small reduction in its prices will lead to an increase in euro zone demand for Norwegian goods that is large relative to Norway’s output. Thus, full employment can be restored fairly quickly. Second, if Norway’s labor and capital markets are closely meshed with those of its euro zone neighbors, unemployed workers can easily move abroad to find work and domestic capital can be shifted to more profitable uses in other countries. The ability of factors to migrate abroad thus reduces the severity of unemployment in Norway and the fall in the rate of return available to investors.\footnote{Installed plant and equipment typically is costly to transport abroad or to adapt to new uses. Owners of such relatively immobile Norwegian capital therefore will always earn low returns on it after an adverse shift in the demand for Norwegian products. If Norway’s capital market is integrated with those of its EMU neighbors, however, Norwegians will invest some of their wealth in other countries, while at the same time part of Norway’s capital stock will be owned by foreigners. As a result of this process of international wealth diversification (see Chapter 21), unexpected changes in the return to Norway’s capital will automatically be shared among investors throughout the fixed exchange rate area. Thus, even owners of capital that cannot be moved can avoid more of the economic stability loss due to fixed exchange rates when Norway’s economy is open to capital flows. When international labor mobility is low or nonexistent, higher international capital mobility may not reduce the economic stability loss from fixed exchange rates, as we discuss in evaluating the European experience in the Case Study on pp. 565–569.}
Notice that our conclusions also apply to a situation in which Norway experiences an increase in demand for its output (a rightward shift of DD). If Norway is tightly integrated with euro zone economies, a small increase in Norway’s price level, combined with some movement of foreign capital and labor into Norway, quickly eliminates the excess demand for Norwegian products.\(^{14}\)

Closer trade links between Norway and countries outside the euro zone will also aid the country’s adjustment to Norwegian DD shifts that are not simultaneously experienced by the euro zone. However, greater trade integration with countries outside the euro zone is a two-edged sword, with negative as well as positive implications for macroeconomic stability. The reason is that when Norway pegs the krone to the euro, euro zone disturbances that change the euro’s exchange rate will have more powerful effects on Norway’s economy when its trading links with non-euro countries are more extensive. The effects would be analogous to an increase in the size of movements in Norway’s DD curve and would raise Norway’s economic stability loss from pegging to the euro. In any case, these arguments do not change our earlier conclusion that Norway’s stability loss from fixing the krone/euro exchange rate falls as the extent of its economic integration with the euro zone rises.

An additional consideration that we have not yet discussed strengthens the argument that the economic stability loss to Norway from pegging to the euro is lower when Norway and the euro zone engage in a large volume of trade. Since imports from the euro zone make up a large fraction of Norwegian workers’ consumption in this case, changes in the krone/euro exchange rate may quickly affect nominal Norwegian wages, reducing any impact on employment. A depreciation of the krone against the euro, for example, causes a sharp fall in Norwegians’ living standards when imports from the euro zone are substantial; workers are likely to demand higher nominal wages from their employers to compensate them for the loss. In this situation the additional macroeconomic stability Norway gets from a floating exchange rate is small, so the country has little to lose by fixing the krone/euro exchange rate.

We conclude that a high degree of economic integration between a country and the fixed exchange rate area that it joins reduces the resulting economic stability loss due to output market disturbances.

The LL schedule shown in Figure 20-4 summarizes this conclusion. The figure’s horizontal axis measures the joining country’s economic integration with the fixed exchange rate area, the vertical axis the country’s economic stability loss. As we have seen, LL has a negative slope because the economic stability loss from pegging to the area’s currencies falls as the degree of economic interdependence rises.

The Decision to Join a Currency Area:
Putting the GG and LL Schedules Together

Figure 20-5 combines the GG and LL schedules to show how Norway should decide whether to fix the krone’s exchange rate against the euro. The figure implies that Norway should do so if the degree of economic integration between Norwegian markets and those of the euro zone is at least equal to \(\theta_1\), the integration level determined by the intersection of GG and LL at point 1.

\(^{14}\)The preceding reasoning applies to other economic disturbances that fall unequally on Norway’s output market and those of its exchange rate partners. A problem at the end of this chapter asks you to think through the effects of an increase in demand for EMU exports that leaves Norway’s export demand schedule unchanged.
Let's see why Norway should peg to the euro if its degree of economic integration with euro zone markets is at least \( \theta_1 \). Figure 20-5 shows that for levels of economic integration below \( \theta_1 \) the \( GG \) schedule lies below the \( LL \) schedule. Thus, the loss Norway would suffer from greater output and employment instability after joining exceeds the monetary efficiency gain, and the country would do better to stay out.

When the degree of integration is \( \theta_1 \) or higher, however, the monetary efficiency gain measured by \( GG \) is greater than the stability sacrifice measured by \( LL \), and pegging the krone’s exchange rate against the euro results in a net gain for Norway. Thus the intersection of \( GG \) and \( LL \) determines the minimum integration level (here, \( \theta_1 \)) at which Norway will desire to peg its currency to the euro.
The *GG-LL* framework has important implications about how changes in a country’s economic environment affect its willingness to peg its currency to an outside currency area. Consider, for example, an increase in the size and frequency of sudden shifts in the demand for the country’s exports. As shown in Figure 20-6, such a change pushes *LL*\(^1\) upward to *LL*\(^2\). At any level of economic integration with the currency area, the extra output and unemployment instability the country suffers by fixing its exchange rate is now greater. As a result, the level of economic integration at which it becomes worthwhile to join the currency area rises to \(\theta_2\) (determined by the intersection of *GG* and *LL*\(^2\) at point 2). Other things equal, increased variability in their product markets makes countries less willing to enter fixed exchange rate areas—a prediction that helps explain why the oil price shocks after 1973 made countries unwilling to revive the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (Chapter 19).

**What Is an Optimum Currency Area?**

The *GG-LL* model we have developed suggests a theory of the optimum currency area. **Optimum currency areas** are groups of regions with economies closely linked by trade in goods and services and by factor mobility. This result follows from our finding that a fixed exchange rate area will best serve the economic interests of each of its members if the degree of output and factor trade among the included economies is high.

This perspective helps us understand, for example, why it may make sense for the United States, Japan, and Europe to allow their mutual exchange rates to float. Even though these regions trade with each other, the extent of that trade is modest compared with regional GNPs, and interregional labor mobility is low. In 1997, for example, U.S. merchandise trade with Western Europe (measured as the average of imports and exports) amounted to only about 2 percent of U.S. GNP; U.S. merchandise trade with Japan was even smaller.

The more interesting question, and the critical one for judging the economic success of EMU, is whether Europe itself makes up an optimum currency area. We take up this topic next.
Case Study

Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?

The theory of optimum currency areas gives us a useful framework for thinking about the considerations that determine whether a group of countries will gain or lose by fixing their mutual exchange rates. A nation's gains and losses from pegging its currency to an exchange rate area are hard to measure numerically, but by combining our theory with information on actual economic performance we can evaluate the claim that Europe, most of which is likely to adopt or peg to the euro, is an optimum currency area.

The Extent of Intra-European Trade

Our earlier discussion suggested that a country is more likely to benefit from joining a currency area if the area's economy is closely integrated with its own. The overall degree of economic integration can be judged by looking at the integration of product markets, that is, the extent of trade between the joining country and the currency area, and at the integration of factor markets, that is, the ease with which labor and capital can migrate between the joining country and the currency area.

In January 1999, at the time of the euro's launch, most EU members exported from 10 to 20 percent of their output to other EU members. That number is far larger than the extent of EU-U.S. trade, but smaller than the amount of trade between regions of the United States. If we take trade relative to GNP as a measure of goods-market integration, the GG-LL model of the last section suggests that a joint float of Europe's currencies against the rest of the world is a better strategy for EU members than a fixed dollar/euro exchange rate would be. The extent of intra-European trade in 1999, however, was not large enough to convey an overwhelming reason for believing that the European Union itself was then an optimum currency area.

To some degree, intra-European trade might have been artificially limited by trade restrictions that the 1992 reforms largely removed—and we would expect some time for the 1992 changes to have their full effects on markets. For some goods (such as consumer electronics), there has been considerable price convergence across EU countries, but for others, among them cars, similar items still can sell for widely differing prices in different European locations. One hypothesis about the persistence of price differentials—favored by euro enthusiasts—is that multiple currencies made big price discrepancies possible, but these will disappear under the single currency. In a careful study of European price behavior since 1990, economists Charles Engel of the University of Wisconsin and John Rogers of the Federal Reserve find that intra-European price discrepancies indeed decreased over the 1990s. They find no evidence, however, of further price convergence after the euro's introduction.\(^{15}\)

A more optimistic view comes from looking at the volume of intra-European trade, shown in Figure 20-7. While the extent of trade has fluctuated since the mid-1980s, the pronounced growth of trade after the start of EMU suggests that the single currency itself

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pronounced growth of trade after the start of EMU suggests that the single currency itself may have encouraged commerce among EU countries, moving them closer to forming an optimum currency area. Detailed econometric study seems to support this hypothesis.  

Interregional trade in the United States remains far greater than intra-EU trade, although it remains to be seen how far the European integration process will go. Estimates discussed in the box on p. 570 suggest that currency union could have a massive trade-creating effect. On balance, however, considering both the price and the quantity evidence to date, it seems unlikely that the combination of the 1992 reforms and the single currency has yet turned the EMU countries into an optimum currency area.

**How Mobile Is Europe's Labor Force?**
The main barriers to labor mobility within Europe are no longer due to border controls. Differences in language and culture discourage labor movements between European countries to a greater extent than is true, for example, between regions of the United States. In one econometric study comparing unemployment patterns in U.S. regions with those in EU

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TABLE 20-2 People Changing Region of Residence in the 1990s (percent of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


countries, Barry Eichengreen of the University of California–Berkeley found that differences in regional unemployment rates are smaller and less persistent in the United States than are differences between national unemployment rates in the European Union.  

Even within European countries labor mobility appears limited, partly because of government regulations. For example, the requirement in some countries that workers establish residence before receiving unemployment benefits makes it harder for unemployed workers to seek jobs in regions that are far from their current homes. Table 20-2 presents evidence on the frequency of regional labor movement in three of the largest EU countries, as compared with the United States. Although these data must be interpreted with caution because the definition of "region" differs from country to country, they do suggest that in a typical year Americans are significantly more footloose than Europeans.  

Other Considerations

While the GG-LL model is useful for organizing our thinking about optimum currency areas, it is not the whole story. At least two other elements affect our evaluation of the euro currency area’s past and prospective performance.

Similarity of Economic Structure The GG-LL model tells us that extensive trade with the rest of the euro zone makes it easier for a member to adjust to output market disturbances that affect it and its currency partners differently. But it does not tell us what factors will reduce the frequency and size of member-specific product market shocks.

A key element in minimizing such disturbances is similarity in economic structure, especially in the types of products produced. Euro zone countries are not entirely dissimilar in manufacturing structure, as evidenced by the very high volume of intranindustry trade—trade in similar products—within Europe (see Chapter 6). There are also important differences, however. The countries of northern Europe are better endowed with capital and skilled labor than the countries in Europe’s south, and EU products that make intensive use of low-skill labor thus are likely to come from Portugal,

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Twelve month percent change in harmonized price index (relative to three lowest inflation rates)

Figure 20-8
Divergent Inflation in the Euro Zone

In 1997 Ireland and the Netherlands both had inflation rates no more than 1.5 percent above the average of the three lowest EU inflation rates. Subsequently, however, both countries have violated that norm, which is one of the Maastricht Treaty’s tests for admission to the euro club.

Spain, Greece, or southern Italy. It is not yet clear whether completion of the single European market will remove these differences by redistributing capital and labor across Europe or increase them by encouraging regional specialization to exploit economies of scale in production.

The first years of the euro were characterized by quite different growth performance among the EMU members. The European Central Bank’s monetary policy stance probably was not appropriate for all. One result was some divergence in inflation rates. Figure 20-8 shows the difference between the 12-month inflation rates in Ireland and the Netherlands and the average of the three lowest national inflation rates in the EU. Both Ireland and the Netherlands breached the inflation convergence criterion (criterion 1 on p. 555) that had qualified them for admission to EMU!

Fiscal Federalism Another consideration in evaluating the euro zone is the European Union’s ability to transfer economic resources from members with healthy economies to those suffering economic setbacks. In the United States, for example, states faring poorly relative to the rest of the nation automatically receive support from Washington in the form of welfare benefits and other federal transfer payments that ultimately come out of the
taxes other states pay. Such fiscal federalism can help offset the economic stability loss due to fixed exchange rates, as it does in the United States. Unfortunately, its limited taxation powers allow the European Union to practice fiscal federalism only on a very small scale.

**Summing Up**

How should we judge Europe in light of the theory of optimum currency areas? On balance, there is little evidence that Europe's product and factor markets are sufficiently unified yet to make it an optimum currency area. There is evidence that national financial markets have become better integrated with each other as a result of the euro, and that the euro has promoted intra-EU trade. But while capital moves with little interference, labor mobility is nowhere near the high level countries would need to adjust smoothly to product market disturbances through labor migration.

Because labor income makes up around two-thirds of GNP in the European Union and the hardships of unemployment are so severe, the low labor mobility between and within EU countries implies that the economic stability loss from euro zone membership could be high. Evidence such losses may turn out to be costly indeed is provided by the persistently high unemployment rates in some euro zone countries (see Table 19-1).

The European Union's current combination of rapid capital migration with limited labor migration may actually raise the cost of adjusting to product market shocks without exchange rate changes. If the Netherlands suffers an unfavorable shift in output demand, for example, Dutch capital can flee abroad, leaving even more unemployed Dutch workers behind than if government regulations were to bottle the capital up within national borders. Severe and persistent regional depressions could result, worsened by the likelihood that the relatively few workers who did successfully emigrate would be precisely those who are most skilled, reliable, and enterprising. Given that labor remains relatively immobile within Europe, the European Union's success in liberalizing its capital flows may have worked perversely to worsen the economic stability loss due to the process of monetary unification. This possibility is another example of the theory of the second best (Chapter 9), which implies that liberalization of one market (the capital market) can reduce the efficiency of EU economies if another market (the labor market) continues to function poorly.

**The Future of EMU**

Europe's single currency experiment is the boldest attempt ever to reap the efficiency gains from using a single currency over a large and diverse group of sovereign states. If EMU succeeds, it will promote European political as well as economic integration, fostering peace and prosperity in a region that could someday include all of eastern Europe and even Turkey. If EMU fails, however, its driving force, the goal of European political unification, will be set back.

What problems will EMU face in the coming years? There are several, some of which we have already discussed:

1. Europe is not an optimum currency area. Therefore, asymmetric economic developments within different countries of the euro zone—developments that might well call for different national interest rates under a regime of individual national currencies—will be hard to handle through monetary policy. Even as the euro's launch was being
How Much Trade Do Currency Unions Create?

Econometric studies seeking to estimate the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade have generally proven inconclusive. EMU is much more, however, than a fixed exchange rate system. It is a true currency union in which all members share a single money issued by a single central bank. Thus, it is not clear at all that the sole effect of EMU on international trade is that of reduced exchange rate volatility. In addition, the possibilities of devaluation, revaluation, and exchange controls are eliminated forever; foreign exchange transaction costs are eliminated; there is a union-wide low-cost system for making payments in the member states; and price comparisons in different countries are absolutely transparent. In principle, therefore, currency unions such as EMU might have large positive effects on trade among members even if the effects of reduced exchange rate volatility alone are much weaker.

Andrew Rose of the University of California–Berkeley set out to test this hypothesis, using 1970–1990 data on 186 countries, dependencies, territories, and colonies. One main innovation in his approach was to study the average effects of currency union not only across time but across different countries. The other was to correct his estimates for determinants of trade other than currency union—including incomes, distance between trading partners, membership in free-trade arrangements, and so on.*

The findings were unexpectedly favorable to the hypothesis that currency unions promote trade. Rose found that on average, two countries that are members of the same currency union trade three times as much with each other as countries that do not share a currency. This is a remarkably big trade-creating effect. Rose also finds significant trade-creating effects of reduced exchange rate volatility even when it occurs without currency union, but those effects are much smaller than those of currency union.

Rose’s results have not gone unchallenged. For example, it could be that countries that have substantial mutual trade for reasons unrelated to monetary arrangements are more likely to form currency unions. In Rose’s pre-EMU sample, moreover, there are very few examples of currency union—slightly less than 1 percent of his total observations. And most of these cases involve tiny countries. Thus, it is not clear that the findings can accurately predict the effects of currency union on the members of EMU, most of whom are fairly large. One relevant case study that is available concerns the dissolution of the more than half-century old Anglo-Irish currency link in 1979, when Ireland joined the EMS and therefore had to decouple its currency from Britain’s pound sterling. (Recall that Britain remained outside the EMS until its brief and ill-fated membership in the early 1990s.) Trade between Ireland and Britain has not suffered greatly.†

Rose anticipates some of these criticisms in his paper and tries to meet them. In any case, as he points out, even if the euro were to raise trade within the euro zone by 50 percent (rather than by the 200 percent his estimates imply), the positive effect on people’s welfare could be immense.‡ Time will tell if the implications of Rose’s study are borne out in Europe.


‡Indeed, a later study by Rose and Eric van Wincoop of the University of Virginia suggests that the true effect of the euro will be closer to a 50 percent increase in intra-European trade. See “National Money as a Barrier to International Trade: The Real Case for Currency Union,” American Economic Review 91 (May 2001), pp. 386–390. This estimated trade-creating effect is smaller than the one Rose found in his original work because Rose and van Wincoop use a more sophisticated model of international trade patterns.
prepared at the end of 1998, for example, Germany’s economy was experiencing negative growth rates while those of Spain, Portugal, and Ireland were growing at healthy clips. Since the national governments within the EU until 1999 were accustomed to having sovereignty over national economic policies, such macroeconomic asymmetries are likely to lead to political pressures on the ECB much stronger than the ones that typically emerge in long-standing political unions such as the United States.

2. A related potential problem is that the single currency project has taken economic union to a level far beyond what the EU has been able (or willing) to do in the area of political union. European economic unification has a centralized power (the ECB) and a tangible expression in the euro; the political counterparts are much weaker. Many Europeans hope that economic union will lead to closer political union, but it is also possible that quarrels over economic policies will sabotage that aim. Furthermore, the lack of a strong EU political center may limit the ECB’s political legitimacy in the eyes of the European public. There is a danger that voters throughout Europe will come to view the ECB as a distant and politically unaccountable group of technocrats unresponsive to people’s needs.

3. In most of the larger EU countries, labor markets remain highly unionized and subject to high government employment taxes and other regulations that impede labor mobility between industries and regions. The result has been persistently high levels of unemployment. Unless labor markets become much more flexible, as in the United States currency union, individual euro zone countries will have a difficult time adjusting to economic shocks. Advocates of the euro have argued that the single currency, by removing the possibility of intra-EMU currency realignments, will impose discipline on workers’ wage demands and speed the reallocation of labor within national economies. It is equally plausible, however, that workers in different euro zone countries will press for wage harmonization to reduce the very high incentive of capital to migrate to the EMU countries with lowest wages.

4. Constraints on national fiscal policy due to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) could be especially painful due to the absence of substantial fiscal federalism within the EU. It remains to be seen if the EU will develop more elaborate institutions for carrying out fiscal transfers from country to country within the euro zone. In the run-up to 1998, EU countries made heroic efforts to squeeze their government budget deficits within the 3 percent of GDP limit set by the Maastricht Treaty. Some euro zone countries have run afoul of the SGP, however, because their apparent fiscal cuts in many cases involved one-time measures or “creative accounting.” These countries must carry out further fiscal restructuring to avoid increased government deficits in the future. But it is unclear when, or whether, they will do so. The evidence to date is that the EU has little ability to enforce the SGP, especially on the larger member states. Indeed, the EU has moved to relax the SGP’s rules by adding several loopholes.

5. In 2004 the EU carried out a large-scale expansion of its membership into eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. That change raises numerous far-reaching challenges for the EU, but some of them have obvious implications for the EMU project. For example, the ESCB’s governing council, where every euro zone member country has a representative and a vote, would become very unwieldly with twice as many national governors present. Agreement must be reached on some scheme of rotating representation, yet it is hard to imagine Germany, for example, ceding its seat, even temporarily, to tiny countries like Latvia and Cyprus. As more countries enter the euro zone the possibility of asymmetric economic shocks will rise, so countries may become less rather than more willing to delegate their votes to regional representatives.
Thus, EMU faces significant challenges in the years ahead. The experience of the United States shows that a large monetary union comprising diverse economic regions can work quite well. For EMU to achieve comparable economic success, however, it will have to make progress in creating a flexible EU-wide labor market, in reforming its fiscal systems, and in deepening its political union. European unification itself will be imperiled unless EMU and its defining institution, the ECB, succeed in delivering prosperity as well as price stability.

**SUMMARY**

1. European Union countries have had two main reasons for favoring mutually fixed exchange rates: They believe monetary cooperation will give them a heavier weight in international economic negotiations, and they view fixed exchange rates as a complement to EU initiatives aimed at building a common European market.

2. The *European Monetary System* of fixed intra-EU exchange rates was inaugurated in March 1979 and originally included Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Austria, Britain, Portugal, and Spain joined much later. Capital controls and frequent realignments were essential ingredients in maintaining the system until the mid-1980s, but since then controls have been abolished as part of the European Union’s wider “1992” program of market unification. During the currency crisis that broke out in September 1992, Britain and Italy allowed their currencies to float. In August 1993 most EMS currency bands were widened to ±15 percent in the face of continuing speculative attacks.

3. In practice all EMS currencies were pegged to Germany’s former currency, the deutsche mark (DM). As a result Germany was able to set monetary policy for the EMS, just as the United States did in the Bretton Woods system. The credibility theory of the EMS holds that participating governments profited from the German Bundesbank’s reputation as an inflation fighter. In fact, inflation rates in EMS countries ultimately tended to converge around Germany’s generally low inflation rate.

4. On January 1, 1999, 11 EU countries initiated an *economic and monetary union (EMU)* by adopting a common currency, the euro, issued by a European System of Central Banks (ESCB). (The initial 11 members were joined by Greece two years later.) The ESCB consists of EU members’ national central banks and a European Central Bank, headquartered in Frankfurt, whose governing council runs monetary policy in EMU. The transition process from the EMS fixed exchange rate system to EMU was spelled out in the *Maastricht Treaty*, signed by European leaders in December 1991.

5. The Maastricht Treaty specified a set of macroeconomic convergence criteria that EU countries would need to satisfy to qualify for admission to EMU. A major purpose of the convergence criteria was to reassure voters in low-inflation countries such as Germany that the new, jointly managed European currency would be as resistant to inflation as the DM had been. A *Stability and Growth Pact (SPG)*, devised by EU leaders in 1997 at Germany’s insistence, may restrict the flexibility of EMU members to carry out fiscal policy at the national level. The SPG and EMU together could therefore deprive individual countries in the euro zone of national fiscal as well as monetary policy, but the SPG has not been enforced in practice, and was weakened in 2005.

6. The theory of *optimum currency areas* implies that countries will wish to join fixed exchange rate areas closely linked to their own economies through trade and factor mobility. A country’s decision to join an exchange rate area is determined by the dif-
ference between the monetary efficiency gain from joining and the economic stability loss from joining. The GG-LL diagram relates both of these factors to the degree of economic integration between the joining country and the larger fixed exchange rate zone. Only when economic integration passes a critical level is it beneficial to join.

7. The European Union does not appear to satisfy all of the criteria for an optimum currency area. Although 1992 removed many barriers to market integration within the European Union and the euro appears to have promoted intra-EU trade, its level still is not very extensive. In addition, labor mobility between and even within EU countries appears more limited than within other large currency areas, such as the United States. Finally, the level of fiscal federalism in the European Union is too small to cushion member countries from adverse economic events.

KEY TERMS

- credibility theory of the EMS, p. 552
- economic and monetary union (EMU), p. 554
- economic stability loss, p. 560
- European Monetary System (EMS), p. 551
- fiscal federalism, p. 569
- Maastricht Treaty, p. 554
- monetary efficiency gain, p. 559
- optimum currency areas, p. 558
- Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), p. 555

PROBLEMS

1. Why might EMS provisions for the extension of central bank credits from strong- to weak-currency members have increased the stability of EMS exchange rates?

2. In the EMS before September 1992 the lira/DM exchange rate could fluctuate by up to 2.25 percent up or down. Assume that the lira/DM central parity and band were set in this way and could not be changed. What would have been the maximum possible difference between the interest rates on one-year lira and DM deposits? What would have been the maximum possible difference between the interest rates on six-month lira and DM deposits? On three-month deposits? Do the answers surprise you? Give an intuitive explanation.

3. Continue with the last question. Imagine that in Italy the interest rate on five-year government bonds was 11 percent per annum; in Germany the rate on five-year government bonds was 8 percent per annum. What would have been the implications for the credibility of the current lira/DM exchange parity?

4. Do your answers to the last two questions require an assumption that interest rates and expected exchange rate changes are linked by interest parity? Why or why not?

5. Norway pegs to the euro, but soon after, EMU benefits from a favorable shift in the world demand for non-Norwegian EMU exports. What happens to the exchange rate of the Norwegian krone against non-euro currencies? How is Norway affected? How does the size of this effect depend on the volume of trade between Norway and the euro zone economies?

6. Use the GG-LL diagram to show how an increase in the size and frequency of unexpected shifts in a country's money demand function affects the level of economic integration with a currency area at which the country will wish to join.

7. During the speculative pressure on the EMS exchange rate mechanism (ERM) shortly before Britain allowed the pound to float in September 1992, the Economist, a London weekly news magazine, opined as follows: